MyTeamSpeakSync compares each item against what the last run left: a change on one side goes to the other, deletions too, and an item changed on both sides is a conflict for the user. The first run pairs items up by identity key or bookmark name and address. Edits are written over the item's Item_Data field by field, so what we do not model survives. The protocol was probed live and checked against the official client: the server stores whatever revisions it is sent and never reports a collision, so the client re-reads the cursors before writing. Edits carry last_known_version like the official client's, which applies them within its one-minute poll. All requests now share one session; signing in for each got the account's logins throttled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.6 KiB
myTeamSpeak in the client
What is implemented, and what two-way sync would still need.
Sign-in and read-only import (done)
core/src/main/java/eu/lixko/ts3j/client/myts/ — pure Java, no Swing/Android dependency, and no JDK API
that Android 13 lacks (hence HttpURLConnection, not java.net.http).
MyTeamSpeakLogin— the account the client stays signed in to. Like the official client'sAccount_Data(which stores email, the login token in itspasswordfield, and the account key asencryption_password), it keepsMyTeamSpeak.Credentials— email, login token, account key — in the private profile filemyteamspeak.properties; never the password.signInderives them, reads the account and only then saves them;fetchreads the account again with the saved ones;signOutdeletes the file. When the server rejects saved credentials (ERROR_LOGIN_FAILED, e.g. the password was changed elsewhere)fetchsigns out. All requests share one session (MyTeamSpeakLogin.request), as the official client's do: signed in on first use, again when the service reports it expired (102/109), ended on sign-out or exit. Signing in for every request gets the account's logins throttled within a few dozen (seen 2026-10-15:logintimed out for minutes).MyTeamSpeak.download(Credentials)— signs in (authentication/login), unwraps the item key, pulls BOOKMARK, IDENTITY and ITEM_FOLDER with onesynchronization/requestServerItemsagainst an empty local state (all-zero global and class versions, no details), decrypts every item, then ends the session (authentication/deleteSession);MyTeamSpeakLogindoes the same in its shared session.MyTsCrypto— PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 login token and account key,LoginSession.keyunwrap (AES-256-GCM), item frame decryption (little-endian AES-CTR + SHA-512 trailer). SeeCRYPTO_RE_SALT.md.MyTsTransport— theapplication/ts3cloudframing over HTTP/1.1; an interface so tests replay a server.- Decrypted items are plain
Item_Data, decoded byteamspeak/SyncItemDecoder.TeamSpeakImportergainsimportSelected(all, chosen)(chosen bookmarks bring the identities they use) andisPresent(item); the policy is the local settings.db import's: additive and idempotent.
Frontends: Swing Options → "myTeamSpeak" tab (MyTeamSpeakPanel); Android Settings → Account →
myTeamSpeak (ui/MyTeamSpeakScreen.kt). Both: sign in/out, the account's bookmarks and identities with a
checkbox each and whether they are imported already, Refresh, "Import selected".
Observed on the live account: a bookmark may name its identity by the identity's name ("Default") instead of its item UUID; the importer resolves both.
Tests: MyTsCryptoTest (captured vectors), MyTeamSpeakTest (download against a replayed server built from
the captured login and item), MyTeamSpeakLoginTest (persistence, failed sign-in, rejected credentials).
Two-way sync
MyTeamSpeakSync (with SyncKind, SyncFields, SyncState): bookmarks and identities, run by hand
(Swing: Options → myTeamSpeak → Synchronize; conflicts in SyncConflictsDialog). A run is
fetch (network) → plan (stores' thread) → user settles Plan.conflicts() → upload (network) → apply
(stores' thread). Nothing changes on either side before upload, and here only after it succeeded.
The comparison is three-way per item, against SyncState (profile file myteamspeak-sync.properties: the
global cursor, each class's cursor, and per item its server revision, plaintext Item_Data and local id).
Changed on one side → carried over (deletions too); on both → a Conflict with a field-by-field diff;
first run → items paired by identity UID or bookmark name+address, the rest carried over. Edits are
written over the item's current Item_Data field by field (ProtobufMessage), so fields this client does not
model survive.
How the service and the official client behave (live, 2026-10-15)
Probed against the test account and by capturing the official 3.6.2 client's traffic.
requestServerItems: a class whose cursor matches comes back empty; any other comes back whole. Item details in the request are ignored; there are no deltas. Deleted items simply vanish.synchronizeItemsstores what it is sent: the class revision (client-made, a fresh UUID), each item's wire revision and blob; replies300and a new global cursor. It never reportsCOLLISION, whatever is stale — conflicts are the client's to find.pushtherefore re-reads the cursors first and fails withchangedMeanwhilewhen any moved.- The official client polls about once a minute with its cursors and the global cursor, and on startup with
random class cursors (a full read). It applies what it reads live; it writes
settings.dbonly later, so read its state from the UI, not the database, while it runs. Our pushes do not reach its push channel. - Its change upload: plaintext
sync_version_uuidnew,last_known_version:= the previous one,manipulated= 3; a fresh wire revision; only the changed items; the global cursor echoed. Adds carrymanipulated= 0. Deletion: the detail'sitem_delte_on_server= 1 under a fresh revision (it also sends the last blob; one without is accepted too). We write the same. - It reports "myTeamSpeak account collision detected" and stops applying when a remote change meets an item it still holds as locally changed. Seen once, after mixed probing; not with the writes above.
Etiquette
One sign-in is three requests. Don't loop sign-ins while testing; the service sits behind Cloudflare and rate-limits abuse.