MyTeamSpeakSync compares each item against what the last run left: a change on one side goes to the other, deletions too, and an item changed on both sides is a conflict for the user. The first run pairs items up by identity key or bookmark name and address. Edits are written over the item's Item_Data field by field, so what we do not model survives. The protocol was probed live and checked against the official client: the server stores whatever revisions it is sent and never reports a collision, so the client re-reads the cursors before writing. Edits carry last_known_version like the official client's, which applies them within its one-minute poll. All requests now share one session; signing in for each got the account's logins throttled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.4 KiB
myTeamSpeak client protocol (reverse-engineered)
Recovered from the official TS3 client binaries (TeamSpeak3-Client-linux_amd64/ts3client_linux_amd64
and re-android/.../libteamspeak_client.so) plus a captured real login/sync session. This documents
what is needed to talk to myTeamSpeak for synchronization of bookmarks/identities/etc.
Transport
Not gRPC-over-HTTP2 in the usual sense. It is HTTP/1.1 POST (cpp-httplib client) to:
https://clientapi.myteamspeak.com/<endpoint>
Endpoints: authentication, session, synchronization, user, integration, messenger, tschat, addon.
Headers: Content-Type: application/ts3cloud, Accept: */*, Connection: close,
User-Agent: cpp-httplib/0.11.1. Cloudflare fronts it and 403s anything that doesn't look right.
Request body framing:
<1 byte: len of method name> <method-name ASCII> <serialized protobuf request>
e.g. 05 "login" <LoginData>, 12 "requestServerItems" <Sync_Request_ItemClasses>.
Response body = the serialized protobuf reply (Content-Type comes back application/json but the
body is protobuf, not JSON).
Services / methods (see myteamspeak.recovered.proto for full schemas)
- LoginService (
/authentication):login(LoginData) -> LoginSession,loginWithAuthToken,loginWithRenewalToken,session,deleteSession,requestAuthToken. - SynchronizationService (
/synchronization):requestServerItems(Sync_Request_ItemClasses) -> Sync_Reply_ItemClasses(download),synchronizeItems(...)(upload/merge).
Login flow (observed)
- POST
/authenticationloginwithLoginData{email(1), password(2)}.passwordis NOT the plaintext — see Crypto below. - Reply
LoginSession:key(1),session(2)=UUID(bearer for later calls),limits(3),uuid(4),error(5)=200on success (ErrorCommon.ERROR_LOGIN_OK),purge(6),username(8),myts_id_data(9)=MyTeamSpeakIdData,mytsid_user_cert(10),alternative_login_info(16).renewal_token. - POST
/synchronizationrequestServerItemswith{session(1), classes(2), globalversion(3)}. Advertise each local item as{item_uuid(1), item_version(2)}whereitem_versionis exactly the local plaintextItem_Data.sync_version_uuid; the initial request builder does not attach blobs. - Reconcile the server's comparison reply. Decrypt any returned
item_blob, honor deletion/not-in-db details, and retain its opaque global and per-class version cursors. - If local changes are requested, POST
synchronizeItemswith those reply cursors. Adds/changes carry the full encryptedItem_Dataframe; deletions use the detail deletion flag. See CRYPTO_RE_SALT.md for the recovered state machine and confidence boundaries.
TeamSpeak 6 item classes
The TS6 binary's Sync_Serializing.proto is newer than the TS3 one in myteamspeak.recovered.proto:
Item_Class 7 is GROUP_CHATS (TS3: ROOM_CATEGORY) and 8 is CONTACTS; Item_Data gains oneof
group_chats(24) and contact(25). Contact{chat_room_id(1), custom_name(2), custom_category(3), notification_preference(4), is_favourite(5), is_direct_chat(6), mytsid(7), chat_member_id(8)}.
TS6 writes one per chat once a custom name, category or notification setting is set — it is room
settings, not the contact list (that is the Matrix rooms) — and never fills mytsid; a direct chat's
chat_member_id is the partner's Matrix ID @<base32 myTS ID bytes>:<homeserver>. The same bytes as
standard base64 are the client_myteamspeak_id servers report (33 bytes, leading 0x01), which is how
TS6 ties a server client to a chat contact.
Crypto status
myTeamSpeak sync is end-to-end encrypted, using TeamSpeak's own teamcrypto library
(AES-256-GCM + SHA-2 via mbedtls + a CTR-DRBG), statically linked — NOT OpenSSL's KDFs and
NOT libsodium. This is why the sync store on disk is plaintext but the wire blobs are not.
Recovered constructions:
- The login
passwordfield is base64 of 48 bytes from PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 with 10,000 iterations: password=password, salt=asciiLower(email) + "ts3Login" + password. - The account wrapping key is the same KDF with salt purpose
ts3Encryptionand a 32-byte output. LoginSession.keyv2 is02 || GCM-tag[16] || IV[12] || ciphertext[32], AES-256-GCM without AAD. Its plaintext is the 32-byte item key.MyTeamSpeakIdData:user_public_key(1)= 32 bytes (X25519/Ed25519),user_private_key(2).encrypted_user_private_key= 112 bytes (the account private key, wrapped by a password-derived key),account_creation_time(3),my_teamspeak_id(4)=01 20 <32 bytes>,public_signature(5).Account_Data/Auth_Token_Packageshow the recovery model:encrypted_encryption_password,encryption_tag,iv— a random data key wrapped by the password-derived key, and separately by the recovery key (32 bytes, base64), so the recovery key is the route to decrypt items without the password.- Item blobs are
IV[16] || AES-256-CTR ciphertext || SHA512(plaintext). CTR increments its full 128-bit counter little-endian. The original capture contained the complete ciphertext but only the first 27 of 64 digest bytes; those bytes exactly match the recovered plaintext hash.
Remaining reverse-engineering gaps
The synchronisation protocol is settled by live probing and capture; see IMPLEMENTATION.md "How the service and the official client behave". Recovery-key import is not recovered.